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WASHINGTON RECOGNIZES WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL
LIFE-A CRITICAL ANALYSIs-Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98
Wn. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
Ten years ago the United States Supreme Court gave parents the legal
right to prevent the birth of children by holding that women have a consti-
tutionally protected right to abortion.1 Since then, medical science has
become increasingly accurate at detecting and predicting birth defects. 2
Parents therefore have more information on their risk of bearing a child
with birth defects, in addition to having the freedom to prevent birth.
As a result, the courts have been faced with an increasing number of
lawsuits brought by children with birth defects and by their parents. 3 Both
parents and children claim that medical malpractice, or failure to impart
material information to the parents, precluded the parents' right to an in-
formed decision on whether to give birth to the child. 4 The parent, under
a wrongful birth claim, 5 seeks damages for the financial and emotional
costs of raising an impaired child. The child, under a wrongful life
claim,6 asserts that he or she would have been better off not being born
and seeks compensation for birth in an impaired condition.
Claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life often arise out of the same
event: birth of a handicapped child. Because the claims rest on different
policy considerations and because they involve different types of injury,
courts have treated them differently. 7 Allowing either cause of action,
however, requires courts to determine that birth of an impaired child is an
injury.
The Washington Supreme Court recently recognized both wrongful
birth and wrongful life causes of action in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc.8 The court joined a growing number of jurisdictions that grant a
1. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
3. See Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a Cause of
Action, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 857, 857 (1980); Note, Wrongful Life and a Fundamental Right to be Born
Healthy: Park v. Chessin; Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 537, 537 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Fundamental Right to be Born Healthy]; Note, Child v. Parent: A Viable New Tort of Wrongful
Life?, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 391, 391 (1982).
4. See infra notes 33-35 & 91-93 and accompanying text.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
7. See infra notes 37 & 95 and accompanying text.
8. 98 Wn. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (certification from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington).
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wrongful birth claim. 9 In recognizing the wrongful life claim, however,
the court broke with the great weight of authority. 10
This Note briefly examines the facts of the Harbeson case. Then, in
separate sections, the Note reviews the legal background for the wrongful
birth and wrongful life causes of action and analyzes and criticizes the
court's reasoning on each claim. The analysis and criticism of the wrong-
ful birth claim is necessary to an evaluation of the court's recognition of
both the wrongful birth and wrongful life claims since the court relied on
its wrongful birth reasoning in recognizing the wrongful life claim. The
Note concludes that the court did not adequately establish the crucial ele-
ments of a wrongful birth cause of action, though accepted tort principles
support recognition of wrongful birth claims. It also concludes that the
court did not adequately support its recognition of a wrongful life cause of
action and that wrongful life claims are incompatible with accepted tort
principles. The Note further concludes that accepted tort principles would
have supported recovery in this case, making it unnecessary to allow the
claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life. Finally, the Note suggests
alternatives to tort litigation to ease the burden of birth defects on the
deformed child and on the deformed child's family.
1. THE FACTS OF HARBESON
During Jean Harbeson's first pregnancy in 1970 she suffered a grand
mal seizure11 and learned that she was an epileptic. 12 Her doctors pre-
scribed the drug Dilantin to control her convulsions.' 3 Three months la-
ter, Mrs. Harbeson gave birth to a normal boy. 14 After the birth she con-
tinued to take Dilantin.15 Between November 1972 and July 1973
Leonard and Jean Harbeson informed three Air Force doctors that they
were considering having other children and that they were concerned
about the risks to the fetus of taking Dilantin during pregnancy. 16 Each
9. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 95 and accompanying text
11. A grand mal seizure is a major seizure characterized by loss of consciousness, muscle
spasms, and repetitive jerking. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 472 (4th lawyer's ed. 1976).
12. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wn. 2d 460, 462, 656 P.2d 483,486 (1983).
13. Id. Dilantin is the first choice of doctors in the treatment of epilepsy. Further, Mrs. Harbeson
had experienced adverse reactions to other anticonvulsants that the doctors had prescribed. Finding of
Fact No. 13, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., No. C78-
302T (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 1981) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited
as Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law].
14. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 462,656 P.2d at 486.
15. Id. at463,656P.2dat486.
16. Id.
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doctor told them that Dilantin could cause cleft palate 17 and temporary
hirsutism,18 but no more serious defects. None of the doctors searched the
literature or consulted other sources for information that might associate
Dilantin with more serious birth defects. 19
Relying on the doctors' assurances, Mrs. Harbeson became pregnant
twice while continuing to take Dilantin as prescribed. 20 She gave birth to
daughters in April 1974 and May 1975. Both girls suffered from fetal hy-
dantoin syndrome,21 which is accompanied by mild to moderate mental
and physical birth defects. 22 The Harbesons said that had they been in-
formed of the potential birth defects associated with the use of Dilantin
during pregnancy, they would not have had any more children. 23
Leonard Harbeson brought a wrongful birth action for himself and his
wife in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington. 24 He also brought a wrongful life action as guardian ad litem for
17. Cleft palate is a congenital defect characterized by a fissure in the midline of the palate result-
ing from the failure of the two sides to fuse during embryonic development. The condition is surgi-
cally correctable. MOSBY'S MEDICAL & NURSINo DICTIONARY 237 (1983). The Harbeson girls were
not affected by cleft palate. Finding of Fact No. 32.
18. Hirsutism is the growth of excessive body hair in a masculine distribution due to heredity,
hormonal dysfunction, or medication. Treatment of the specific cause will stop the growth of the hair.
MOSBY'S MEDICAL & NURSING DICTIONARY 513 (1983). The Harbeson girls were not affected by
hirsutism. Finding of Fact No. 32.
19. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 463,656 P.2d at 486.
20. Id. The U.S. District Court, see infra note 24, did not determine whether prescription of
Dilantin during pregnancy was negligent given Mrs. Harbeson's need for an anticonvulsant and her
inability to take other anticonvulsants to control her serious epilepsy. According to the PHYSICIANS'
DESK REFERENCE, anticonvulsants, when being used to prevent major seizures, should not be discon-
tinued during pregnancy because of the strong possibility of precipitating seizures "with attendant
hypoxia and threat to life." PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1420 (36th ed. 1982).
21. Fetal hydantoin syndrome was first described in August 1975. Hanson & Smith, The Fetal
Hydantoin Syndrome, 87 J. OF PEDIATRICS 285 (1975). The syndrome is associated with a group of
drugs called hydantoins, of which Dilantin is one, Finding of Fact No. 8, and involves birth defects
such as cleft palate, hirsutism, growth deficiencies, cardiac defects, skeletal anomalies, developmen-
tal defects, and mild to moderate retardation. Finding of Fact No. 31.
22. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at463, 656 P.2d at486.
23. Id. It is not clear whether the Harbesons would have aborted if they had been informed of the
defects after conception. The district court concluded only that they would not have had any more
children. Finding of Fact No. 34. This is a potentially important distinction because if the Harbesons
would have been unwilling to abort, the physicians would be relieved of liability simply by passing
on the available information about Dilantin, whereas if the Harbesons claimed that they would have
aborted to avoid the defect, the physicians may have had the additional duty to give the Harbesons
information about amniocentesis. Given the sketchy information available about Dilantin in 1972 and
1973, see infra note 27, the information may not have been sufficient to influence a reasonable per-
son's decision to conceive. See infra note 48. It may have been sufficient, however, to lead a reason-
able person to undergo amniocentesis after conception to detect the improbable but possible defects
associated with Dilantin. Thus, the physician's duty may depend on what the Harbesons meant by
saying that they would not have had any more children.
24. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wn. 2d 460,461, 656 P.2d 483,483 (1983). Defendants
in the suit were the United States of America, employer of the three military doctors who treated Jean
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his two daughters. 25 The Harbesons claimed that the two girls were born
with physical and mental defects because the doctors failed to inform the
parents of the risks of birth defects caused by Dilantin. 26 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington found that
Dilantin caused the defects and that all four Harbesons were entitled to
recover damages. 27 The district court certified four questions of law to the
Harbeson, and Parke-Davis, Inc., manufacturer of Dilantin. Id. at 462, 656 P.2d at 486. The trial
was split because the claim against the United States could not be tried to a jury under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402 (1976). Conclusion of Law No. 3. The claim against
Parke-Davis, Inc. was tried to a jury. Finding of Fact No. 2. The claim against the United States was
tried to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Judge Jack E. Tanner
presiding. Finding of Fact No. 3.
25. Harbeson. 98 Wn. 2d at 464, 656 P.2d at 487.
26. See id. at 462-63, 656 P.2d at 486. Because the alleged negligent act of the doctors was a
failure to impart material information to the Harbesons under the informed-consent doctrine, the in-
jury suffered by the Harbesons was not the children's defects but the births themselves. See id. at
472, 656 P.2d at 491. Thus, the claims were based on wrongful birth and wrongful life. Id. at 476,
483. 656 P.2d at 493, 497.
27. Id. at 464, 656 P.2d at 487. Among the pertinent Conclusions of Law were the following:
4. Dilantin was a proximate cause of the defects and anomalies suffered by Elizabeth and
Christine Harbeson.
5. The physicians at Madigan were the agents of the Defendant United States of America, and
said Defendant is responsible for the acts and omissions of the Madigan physicians.
6. Plaintiff, Leonard Harbeson, is the duly appointed guardian ad litem for the minor plain-
tiffs herein, Elizabeth and Christine Harbeson, and is authorized to bring the present action on
their behalf.
7. The physicians at Madigan failed to conduct a literature search or to consult other sources
in regard to the effects of Dilantin during pregnancy, even though the plaintiffs Leonard and
Jean Harbeson specifically asked all three Madigan physicians about possible birth defects asso-
ciated with the mother's consumption of Dilantin during pregnancy. Said acts of the Madigan
physicians:
a. breached the standard of care for the average physician acting under the same or similar
circumstances, and the physicians were thereby negligent;
b. were not reasonably prudent, and therefore, were negligent.
8. An adequate literature search, or consulting other sources, would have yielded such infor-
mation of material risks associated with Dilantin in pregnancy that reasonably prudent persons in
the position of the Harbesons would attach significance to such risks in deciding whether to have
further children.
9. Each of the four Harbeson Plaintiffs has sustained permanent and severe damages and
injuries past, present and future, as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Madi-
gan physicians.
10. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages from the Defendant United States of America.
Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 463-64, 656 P.2d at 486-87.
These conclusions of law become questionable, at best, when some of the facts on which they are
based are examined. First, Conclusion of Law No. 4 should be viewed in light of the fact that the jury
in the claim against Parke-Davis, Inc., found that Dilantin was not the cause of the defects. Special
Verdict Form, Response 1, Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., No. C78-302T (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4.
1981) (copy on tile with the Washington Law Review). Even the current edition of the PHYSICIANS'
DESK REFERENCE states that reports linking anticonvulsants to defects cannot be regarded as sufficient
to prove a cause and effect relationship. PHYsICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1420 (36th ed. 1982). Second.
Conclusion of Law Nos. 7 & 8 are weakened by an examination of the meager information that a
literature search would have revealed had the physicians made one. The literature search should have
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Washington Supreme Court to determine the status of wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions in Washington. 28
The Washington Supreme Court held: (1) both wrongful birth and
wrongful life are recognized causes of action in Washington;2 9 (2) the
Harbesons had claims based on both medical malpractice and lack of in-
formed consent; 30 (3) the damages recoverable by Leonard and Jean
Harbeson for wrongful birth were the excess costs of raising two children
with defects over the costs of raising two normal children; 31 and (4) the
damages recoverable by Elizabeth and Christine Harbeson for wrongful
life were the excess costs for special medical treatment and training re-
quired because of their defects over the costs of medical treatment and
training required by children not afflicted with those defects. 32
II. WRONGFUL BIRTH
A. Legal Background
A claim for wrongful birth is an action brought by parents against a
taken place in 1972 and 1973, but the first article describing fetal hydantoin syndrome was not pub-
lished until 1975. See supra note 20. Further, the PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENcE for the years
1972-1973 in describing Dilantin said that "evidence of a teratogenic effect in the human has not
been established." Finding of Fact No. 33. The only other literature specifically noted by the District
Court was an article in a British journal, Speidel & Meadows, Maternal Epilepsy and Abnormalities
of the Fetus and Newborn, 2 LANCEr 839 (1972), [hereinafter cited as Speidel], that discussed fetal
abnormalities in children with epileptic mothers. Finding of Fact No. 20. That article, however, did
not specifically link those defects to Dilantin. Speidel, supra, at 843; Respondent's Brief at 5, Harbe-
son v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wn. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). Thus, it seems unlikely that the
physicians would have found any significant information linking Dilantin to birth defects even if they
had made a literature search.
28. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 464, 656 P.2d at 487. The certification was pursuant to the pro-
cedures established in WASH. REV. CODE § 21.60.020 (1981) and WASH. R. App. P. 16.16 (1977).
The four questions were:
I. May Plaintiff parents Leonard and Jean Harbeson maintain a "wrongful birth" action?
2. If the answer to question number one is "yes",
a. Are the claims of Leonard and Jean Harbeson controlled by RCW 4.24.010 and/or RCW
4.24.290?
b. May Leonard and Jean Harbeson recover damages?
3. May Plaintiff children Elizabeth and Christine Harbeson maintain a "wrongful life"
claim?
4. If the answer to question three is "yes",
a. Are the claims of Elizabeth and Christine Harbeson controlled by RCW 4.24.290?
b. May Elizabeth and Christine Harbeson recover damages?
Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 464, 656 P.2d at 487.
29. Id. at 467,483,656 P.2d at 488,497.
30. Id. at477,656 P.2d at494.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497. The child's damages are limited to the costs for special care and
training during the child's majority if the parents recovered such costs for the child's minority in a
wrongful birth action. Id. at 480, 656 P.2d at 495.
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physician 33 whose negligence in treating the mother caused her to give
birth to a deformed child. The negligence can be either (1) a failure to
provide parents with material facts necessary to an informed decision
whether to conceive or give birth to a child, 34 or (2) a failure to conform
to the accepted standard of care in performing medical treatment under-
taken to prevent the conception or birth of a deformed child. 35 In short,
the parents claim that "but for" the physician's negligence, they would
not have conceived or given birth to the deformed child. 36 Consequently,
the parents seek to recover damages to compensate them for the added
financial and emotional costs of caring for and raising that child.
All eleven jurisdictions that have considered the question of wrongful
birth recognize the claim. 37 This trend is largely a product of two concur-
rent developments. 38 The first is the expanding ability of medical science
33. In most wrongful birth and wrongful life cases the negligent act is by a physician. Logically,
however, the elements of the two claims could also be proven in a claim against other providers of
health care if their negligence caused a lack of information or false information on which the parents
based their decision to bear the child. Thus, ultrasonography technicians, lab technicians performing
amniocentesis tests, and similar professionals may be liable under wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims.
34. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 465, 656 P.2d at 487; Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth:
Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 715 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Rogers]
35. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (1981); Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at467, 656
P.2d at 488.
36. Wrongful birth claims must be distinguished from other related claims. In wrongful birth
claims the parents do not claim that the physician caused the defects but, rather, that the physician
caused the birth itself. Birth is the injury, and the physician caused it by precluding the parents'
informed decision on whether to conceive, bear, or abort the deformed child. Thus, the injury is not
actionable under standard medical malpractice principles. The children in wrongful birth cases have
mental or physical defects. If the children are born healthy but unwanted, the claim is more accu-
rately called "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy." See Phillips v. United States. 508 F.
Supp. 544, 545 n. I (D.S.C. 198 1); Rogers, supra note 34, at 740-41.
37. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (construing Alabama law); Phillips v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F.
Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1982); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio
St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). Recognition of the claim appears to be a
clear trend in the law. Rogers, supra note 34, at 741-48. The Illinois Supreme Court recently rejected
a "wrongful birth" claim, but the births in both of the consolidated cases were of healthy children.
Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 IIl. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983). Thus, the claims technically were
not wrongful birth claims. See supra note 36.
38. Rogers, supra note 34, at 743; Note, Torts-Wrongful Birth-New Jersey Recognizes Emo-
tional Distress Damages in a Wrongful Birth Action Involving a Deformed Child-Berman v. Allan,
55 WASH L. REV 701,704 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Birth Note].
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to predict and detect birth defects before conception or birth. These ad-
vances make it possible to detect the majority of known birth defects and
allow parents to determine before birth whether the child will be affected
by any of them. 39 As these advances have become accepted and avail-
able, the courts have become more willing to find negligence in a physi-
cian's failure to inform parents of their availability.
The second and more important development is the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.40 In Roe v. Wade, the
Court placed abortion decisions within a woman's constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy. 41 The decision also denied constitutional protec-
tion to the fetus because the fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment. 42 Thus, the parents may decide to abort if they
know or have reason to believe that the child could be born with birth
defects. Given the availability of means to discover birth defects during
pregnancy and given the parents' legal right to act on that information to
prevent birth, courts have found that a physician's negligent interference
with that right is actionable. 43
39. The two most refined diagnostic techniques are amniocentesis and ultrasonography. Amnio-
centesis is an obstetric procedure in which a small amount of amniotic fluid containing fetal cells is
removed for laboratory analysis. The procedure is accomplished by inserting a needle attached to a
syringe through the woman's abdomen and into her uterus. MOSBY'S MEDICAL & NuRSING DIcrIo-
NARY 48 (1983). Amniocentesis can detect all known chromosomal abnormalities and 70 of 125
known metabolic defects. NATIONAL FOUNDATION/MARCH OF DIMES, BIRTH DEFECTS, TRAGEDY AND
HOPE 15-16 (1977).
Ultrasonography is the "location, measurement or delineation of deep structures by measuring the
reflection or transmission of ultrasonic waves." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1508 (4th Law-
yer's ed. 1976). Ultrasonography may be used by itself to detect anatomical abnormalities or in com-
bination with amniocentesis. MOSBY'S MEDICAL & NuRSING DICTIONARY 48 (1983). It is an especially
desirable procedure because it presents no discernible risk to the fetus. See Note, Father and Mother
Know Best: Defining Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L. J. 1488,
1493 n.22 (1978).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is generally recognized that Roe v. Wade is the primary development
allowing recognition of wrongful birth claims. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.
1981); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Note, Robak v. United States: A
Precedent-Setting Damage Formula for Wrongful Birth, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 725, 732 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Damage Formula Note]; Wrongful Birth Note, supra note 38 at 704; Comment,
"Wrongful Birth": Should Liability be Imposed Upon a Physician Who Fails to Warn Parents of the
Risks of Defects in Their Unborn Children?, 14 GoNz. L. Rtv. 891, 900 (1979).
41. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Supreme Court derived the woman's right of privacy from
the fourteenth amendment and held that this right included the right to make decisions on whether to
abort. Id. The woman's right to abort is virtually unlimited in the first trimester and is limited only by
the state's interest in maternal health in the second trimester. Thus, the woman has time to undergo
fetal testing and get the results while she still has a relatively unfettered right to an abortion. She may
still abort in the third trimester unless the state has exercised its right to regulate or prohibit abortions
in the interest of protecting the potential life of the fetus. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65
(1973).
42. Id. at 158.
43. The necessity of Roe v. Wade to wrongful birth claims has been recognized by the courts.
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B. The Harbeson Court's Reasoning
The court noted that a wrongful birth claim has been defined as an ac-
tion in which parents allege that their physician's failure to inform them
of the increased possibility that the mother would give birth to a child
suffering from birth defects precluded an informed decision about
whether to have the child and resulted in the birth of a deformed child. 44
The Harbeson court expanded this standard definition of wrongful birth to
include the negligent performance of medical procedures designed to
avoid conception, discover a defect, or terminate a pregnancy. 45 In both
cases, the negligence is alleged to be the proximate cause of the birth of a
deformed child.
Because wrongful birth is based on negligence, specifically medical
malpractice, the court examined the tort principles that govern actions
against physicians. The four elements necessary to recover in any negli-
gence action are: duty, breach, proximate causation, and injury. 46 Duty,
according to the court, is the critical concept. 47 The court noted that the
physician's duty to the patient includes the obligation to impart all mate-
rial information regardless of community standards. 48 Medical science
See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp.. 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975). Roe v. Wade is unnecessary to wrongful birth claims
based on pre-conception negligence or failure to inform, in which the parents claim that but for the
physician's negligence they would not have conceived. The decision is, however, necessary for
claims based on post-conception failure to inform, at least in states where abortions are against public
policy. In these claims the parents must assert that "but for" the physician's negligence they would
have aborted.
44. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 465, 656 P.2d at 487 (quoting Comment, Berman v. Allan, 8 HOFS.
TRA L. REV 257, 257-58 (1979)).
45. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 467, 656 P.2d at 488.
46. Id. at 468, 656 P.2d at 489 (citing Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn. 2d 424, 434, 553 P.2d 1096,
1102 (1976)).
47. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 471,656 P.2d at 491.
48. Id. at 470, 656 P.2d at 490. The informed-consent doctrine requires that information be
given to patients because a reasonable person would consider it in making a decision, not because
other practitioners in the community would give it to their patients. See generally Zebarth v. Swedish
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 81 Wn. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972) (discussing the informed-consent doctrine in
Washington); Miller v. Kennedy, II Wn. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974)(same), affd per curiam.
85 Wn. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975). The legislature adopted the informed-consent doctrine in 1976.
Act of Feb. 21, 1976, ch. 56, § 8(3), 1975-76 Wash. Laws 217-18 (codified at WASH REv. CODE §
7.70.030(3) (1982)). The statutory elements of an informed-consent action are as follows:
(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof that injury resulted from health care in
a civil negligence case or arbitration involving the issue of the alleged breach of the duty to
secure an informed consent by a patient or his representatives against a health care provider:
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a material fact or facts relating
to the treatment;
(b) That the patient consented to the treatment without being aware of or fully informed of
such material fact or facts;
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has given the health care system the ability to detect birth defects in the
unborn child and to predict them before conception. 49 The court noted
that, given accurate information, parents may prevent the birth of a de-
formed child even after conception. 50 The court concluded that it must
recognize the benefits of these legal and scientific developments and held
that the parents have a right to prevent the birth of deformed children. 51
The court found that physicians have a duty, "correlative" to that
right, to impart to parents all material information on the likelihood of
birth defects in future children to enable parents to decide whether to
avoid conception or birth of such children. 52 If any medical procedures
are undertaken, the physician also has the duty to use reasonable care. 53
The court found the second element of the tort analysis more straight-
forward. It said that" [b]reach [of the duty] will be measured by failure to
conform to the appropriate standard of skill, care, or learning.'54 This
standard of care is defined both by statute55 and by judicial decision56 and
includes the duty to inform the patient of material risks.57
(c) That a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not have consented
to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts;
(d) That the treatment in question proximately caused injury to the patient.
(2) Under the provisions of this section a fact is defined as or considered to be a material fact,
if a reasonably prudent person in the position of the patient or his representative would attach
significance to it in deciding whether or not to submit to the proposed treatment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1982).
49. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 472, 656 P.2d at 491. See also supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
50. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 473, 656 P.2d at 492 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.290, 7.70.040 (1982) and
Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn. 2d 246,595 P.2d 919 (1979)).
55. The Washington legislature has defined the standard of care in two statutes. The first statute
provides in part:
In any civil action for damages based on professional negligence against a hospital . . . or
against a member of the healing arts . . . the plaintiff in order to prevail shall be required to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant or defendants failed to exercise that
degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession and that as a
proximate result of such failure the plaintiff suffered damages, but in no event shall the provi-
sions of this section apply to an action based on the failure to obtain the informed consent of a
patient.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1982).
The second statute provides:
The following shall be necessary elements of proof that injury resulted from the failure of the
health care provider to follow the accepted standard of care:
(1) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected
of a reasonably prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which he belongs, in the
state of Washington, acting in the same or similar circumstances;
(2) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (1982).
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The court derived the third element, injury, from its discussion of duty.
The court reasoned that the "inevitable consequence" of recognizing the
right of parents and the correlative duty of the physician is "that the birth
of [a deformed] child is an actionable injury." 58 Thus, just as the physi-
cian's duty is a product of the parents' right, the parents' injury is a prod-
uct of the breach of the physician's duty.
Finally, the court considered proximate cause. Proximate cause is es-
tablished by showing that the breach of a duty was a cause in fact of the
injury and that, as a matter of law, liability should result. 59 Cause in fact
in wrongful birth claims is established by proving that "but for" the phy-
sician's breach of duty, the deformed child would not have been born.
The court decided that, in wrongful birth cases, cause in fact establishes
proximate cause. 60
After reviewing the four elements of the wrongful birth claim, the court
concluded that imposing liability is a policy decision. It decided to recog-
nize a cause of action for wrongful birth because the claim (1) "conforms
comfortably to the structure of tort principles," 61 (2) "is a logical and
necessary development" given legal and scientific advances, 62 and (3)
"will 'promote societal interests in genetic counseling and prenatal test-
ing, deter medical malpractice, and at least partially redress a clear and
undeniable wrong.' "63
More troublesome to the court was the issue of damages. 64 The court
relied on section 4.24.010 of the Washington Revised Code, which pro-
vides an action for the death or injury of a child. The court acknowledged
that the statute is not on point,65 but thought that the policy considerations
underlying the statute applied equally to wrongful birth. 66 The court held
56. The standard of care in Washington is set forth in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn. 2d 246, 253, 595
P.2d 919, 924 (1979) and Helling v. Carey, 83 Wn. 2d 514, 519, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974). The
applicable standard of care in 1972 and 1973-the average practitioner standard-was set forth in
Hayes v. Hulswit, 73 Wn. 2d 796, 797, 440 P.2d 849,850 (1968).
57. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 470, 656 P.2d at 490.
58. Id. at 473, 656 P.2d at 492.
59. Id. at 476, 656 P.2d at 493.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 467, 656 P.2d at 488.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 473, 656 P.2d at 491 (quoting Rogers, supra note 34, at 757).
64. Id. For a discussion of how other courts have treated the damages problem, see Rogers,
supra note 34, at 750-52 and Comment, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by
Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 127 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Birth Damages]. See also
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (allowing pecuni-
ary but not emotional damages); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (granting both
pecuniary and emotional damages).
65. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 475, 656 P.2d at 493.
66. Id. The statute provides in part:
The mother or father or both may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a
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that "recovery may include the medical, hospital, and medication ex-
penses attributable to the child's birth and to its defective condition, and
in addition damages for the parents' emotional injury caused by the birth
of the defective child." 67
C. Analysis
The claim for wrongful birth is the easier of the two causes of action to
support logically because of the United States Supreme Court's decision,
in Roe v. Wade, that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to an
abortion. 68 Recognition of a cause of action for wrongful birth not only
relies on Roe v. Wade69 but is a logical consequence of that decision.70 If
a woman has a constitutionally protected right to abort, and the fetus has
no constitutionally protected right to life, the woman has a claim against
any physician who interferes with the woman's exercise of her right by
breaching the duty to impart material information to the woman or by
failing to use reasonable care in treating her. 71
Even granting the justification for wrongful birth claims that originates
in Roe v. Wade, the Harbeson court failed to establish several crucial
elements of the claim. Two issues deserve special attention: injury and
damages.
minor child, or a child on whom either, or both, are dependent for support . . . . In such an
action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication expenses, and loss of services
and support, damages may be recovered for the loss of love and companionship of the child and
for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the
circumstances of the case, may be just.
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 (1982).
67. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 475, 656 P.2d at 493.
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
70. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979). Courts that considered the claim
before Roe v. Wade denied recovery because of the public policy against abortion. See, e.g., Gleit-
man v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 701 (1967) (Francis, J., concurring); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d
531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), affid mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640
(1972). Courts that have considered the wrongful birth claim since Roe v. Wade have granted recov-
ery on the grounds that because a woman has a constitutionally protected right to an abortion, she also
has a right to have all available information necessary for an informed decision on whether to exercise
that right. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471,475 (7th Cir. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978). At least one commentator has even
suggested that wrongful birth claims should be allowed as one way to put meaning into the woman's
right to an abortion. WrongfulBirth Note, supra note 38, at 706.
71. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D.S.C. 1981); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421,404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Rogers, supra note 34, at 753.
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1. Injury
The court stated that birth is the actionable injury,72 but it never made
clear how it determined that birth is an injury. The court approached the
question from a concept of duty: that is, the court found the injury to be a
product of a breach of duty. 73 In essence, the court found that the parents
had the right to avoid the birth of a deformed child, and a breach of the
duty to protect that right led to the injury, which was the birth of a de-
formed child. But this reasoning puts the cart before the horse. "Duty" is
shorthand for the conclusion that the defendant has a legal obligation to
protect the plaintiff from any of the defendant's actions that risk injury to
the plaintiff.7 4 Thus, crucial to the concept of duty is the prior determina-
tion that the defendant's actions risk injury to the plaintiff.
It is plausible that the additional economic and emotional costs of rais-
ing a deformed child are an injury to parents who could have avoided
them. 75 Therefore, the court's failure to realize that injury-not duty-is
the critical concept is not fatal to its recognition of wrongful birth. This
failure, however, weakens the court's discussion of wrongful life. The
court relied on its wrongful birth reasoning to establish the wrongful life
cause of action. The court's failure to recognize that injury is the critical
concept and to show that birth with defects is an injury is fatal to its analy-
sis when, as in the wrongful life claim, the injury cannot be indepen-
dently established.7 6
2. Damages
Assuming that birth is an injury, the court's rationale for granting the
damages that it did is faulty. The court relied on section 4.24.010 of the
Washington Revised Code, which it acknowledged is not on point. 77 This
statute provides an "[a]ction for injury or death of a child" 78-an action
that arises in a situation very different from the birth of a deformed child.
Under the statute, the parents' loss is basically measured by the difference
between the parents' condition before the child's injury or death and their
72. Harbeson. 98 Wn. 2d at 473.656 P.2d at 492.
73. Id. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
74. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971). As articulated by Judge, later Justice, Car-
dozo, "[tihe risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339. 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). See also infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
75. Wrongful Birth Damages, supra note 64, at 131; see, e.g.. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic. 260
N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813.
413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978) (discussing the elements of the injury).
76. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
77. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 475, 656 P.2d at 493.
78. WAStt REV CODE§4.24.010(1982).
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condition after the injury or death. Because the parents of a deformed
child had no chance of having a normal child, they have not had their
condition worsened in the same way. Thus, section 4.24.010 applies to a
loss the parents neither suffered nor could have suffered.
The policy considerations that should underlie damage awards in
wrongful birth claims are also different from those underlying section
4.24.010. One policy consideration is the certainty with which damages
are measurable. A fundamental principle is that the plaintiff must estab-
lish the amount of damages with reasonable certainty. 79 The requirement
of reasonable certainty is necessary to eliminate speculation and conjec-
ture in the award of damages. 80 If damages are uncertain or based on
undue speculation, the damages claim should be dismissed. 81 Allowing
damages for the death or injury of a child is, presumably, a determination
that such damages may be fixed with reasonable certainty.
For two reasons, damages in wrongful birth claims lack the certainty of
damages in claims for the death or injury of an existing child. First, since
tort damages are compensatory in nature, 82 the purpose of damages is to
restore the parents to the position they would have been in had the injury
not occurred. 83 Thus, the parents' condition before and after the child's
injury must be compared. In the case of injury to an existing child, this is
relatively straightforward: the amount of damages is the value of the dif-
ference between life with the previously healthy child and life with the
injured child. In wrongful birth claims it is far more difficult since life
with an impaired child should be compared to a situation that never ex-
isted: life with a child without defects. In short, in claims of injury to an
existing child both the pre-injury and post-injury situations are known and
may be compared to measure damages. In wrongful birth claims, only the
post-injury situation is known and it must be compared to a condition that
did not exist.
Uncertainty in the measure of damages in wrongful birth claims also
arises from the rule that the damages from a tortious act must be reduced
by the value of any benefit from the act. 84 The courts that have considered
79. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3 (1973); Wrongful Birth Damages,
supra note 64, at 147.
80. D. DOBBS. supra note 79, § 3.3; WrongfulBirth Damages, supra note 64, at 147.
81. D. DOBBS, supra note 79, § 3.3; Wrongful Birth Damages, supra note 64, at 147.
82. D. DOBBS, supra note 79, § 3.1; C. MCCORMICK. HANDBOOKONTHE LAWOF DAMAGES, § 137
(1935).
83. WrongfulBirth Damages, supra note 64, at 146; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 82, at § 137.
84. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and
in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the
value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is
equitable.
Washington Law Review
wrongful birth claims recognize that there is some benefit in having even
a deformed child. 85 Thus, in fixing damages the benefit should be offset
against the harm. 86
In claims for the injury or death of an existing child, the benefits and
harms of the injurious act are determined by comparing the condition of
the parents before and after the injury. In wrongful birth claims, the bene-
fit of a deformed child to parents who could not have had a normal child
must be assigned a value and offset against the costs of the child before
damages can be fixed. 87 This valuation involves an uncertainty not pre-
sent in the types of damages section 4.24.010 of the Washington Revised
Code was intended to measure.
Thus, section 4.24.010 should not be used to determine the types of
damages allowed in wrongful birth claims. Certainly, the legislature did
not contemplate wrongful birth claims when it enacted section
4.24.010.88 Damages in wrongful birth claims are more uncertain than
damages for death or injury of an existing child. The policy that damages
be reasonably certain is satisfied by applying section 4.24.010 to injury or
death of an existing child, but not to birth of deformed children.
In conclusion, the court's acceptance of the wrongful birth cause of
action can be justified, given the Supreme Court's protection of a
woman's right to abort. Nevertheless, the court failed to develop ade-
quately the elements of the claim. Two major issues that the Washington
courts will have to define in granting wrongful birth claims are injury and
damages. The Harbeson court's reasoning on both issues is, at best, su-
perficial.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). For a discussion of the benefits rule, see Damage
Formula Note, supra note 79, at § 3.6; Wrongful Birth Damages, supra note 64, at 145-64. See also
D. DOBBS. supra note 79, at § 3.8; C. MCCORMICK. supra note 82, at § 40.
85. E.g.. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974) (parents electing to keep
the impaired child in effect assert that the benefits outweigh the costs); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511,517-18 (1971); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
86. Wrongful Birth Note, supra note 38, at 710. This is true of both pecuniary and emotional
damages. Wrongful Birth Damages, supra note 64, at 158; Wrongful Birth Note, supra note 38, at
711.
87. Wrongful Birth Damages, supra note 64, at 130; Wrongful Birth Note, supra note 38, at 711.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 was originally enacted in 1869. Act of Dec. 2, 1869, § 9, 1869
Wash. Terr. Stat. 4. It was amended to read as it does now in 1973. Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 154, §
4, 1973 Wash. Laws 1124-25. Thus, the present statute was enacted several years before states
began recognizing wrongful birth claims, see supra note 37, and fifteen years before the Washington
court considered wrongful birth.
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III. WRONGFUL LIFE
A. Legal Background
A claim for wrongful life is an action brought by or on behalf of a child
suffering from birth defects. 89 The child sues a physician for negligence
in permitting the child's conception or birth. That negligence can be ei-
ther (1) a failure to provide the parents with material facts necessary to an
informed decision on whether to conceive or give birth to a child, 90 or (2)
a failure to conform to the accepted standard of care in performing medi-
cal treatment or tests undertaken to prevent the conception or birth of a
deformed child. 91 The claim is not that the negligence caused the defect,
but, rather, that "but for" the negligent act, the child would not have
been born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to the de-
formity. 92
Wrongful life claims have been almost uniformly denied. Seven of the
eight jurisdictions that considered the question prior to Harbeson do not
recognize a cause of action for wrongful life. 93 Each of these courts al-
lows actions for wrongful birth,94 but only the California Supreme Court
has allowed an action for wrongful life. In Turpin v. Sortini,95 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court allowed special damages to compensate for the ad-
ded cost of life in an impaired condition, but denied general damages for
pain and suffering. 96
Courts have refused to grant wrongful life claims for two primary rea-
sons. First, the courts have reasoned that recognizing a duty to the unborn
child to prevent its birth with defects represents a "disavowal" of the
89. Like wrongful birth claims, wrongful life claims must be distinguished from several similar
claims. In wrongful life claims, the plaintiff-child is born with mental or physical defects. The child
does not claim that the physician caused the defects but, rather, that the physician negligently caused
him or her to be born and thus to experience the pain and suffering associated with the defects.
Children who are born healthy but unhappy with their life have claims more accurately called "dissa-
tisfied life" or "unplanned life." Rogers, supra note 34, at 717-18; see also Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41
11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (child born illegitimate
after father falsely promised to marry mother to induce her to engage in sexual relations with him).
90. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 478, 656 P.2d at 494; Rogers, supra note 34, at 715.
91. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at478, 656 P.2d at494.
92. Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TuL. L. REv. 480, 485 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as WrongfulLife Comment].
93. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (dicta); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766,233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
94. See supra note 37.
95. 31 Cal. 3d 220,643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
96. Id. at 240, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
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sanctity of life, thus going against one of society's most deeply held be-
liefs: that life in any condition is more precious than non-life. 97 Because a
wrongful life claim forces a court to conclude that non-life is preferable to
life with defects, 98 courts have found that these claims violate the "public
policy supporting the preciousness of human life.' 99
Second, the courts have concluded that the plaintiff has suffered no
injury cognizable at law. 100 Without finding injury, a court cannot assess
or award damages. Tort damages attempt to compensate for a loss suf-
fered by the plaintiff by comparing the plaintiff's situation before and
after the tortious act. 101 In a wrongful life claim, injury is measured, not
by the difference between life in a deformed condition and normal life,
but by "the difference in value between life in an impaired condition and
the 'utter void of nonexistence.' "102 The courts have found themselves
incompetent to make this comparison. 103 The inability to evaluate the dif-
ference between impaired life and nonexistence leads to an inability to
establish injury and, hence, to assess damages.
97. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978); Fundamental Right to be
Born Healthy. supra note 3, at 542. At least one commentator has suggested that recent right-to-die
cases, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), illustrate
that society no longer views life in any condition as more precious than non-life. Rogers, supra note
34. at 736. But the right-to-die cases are not analogous to wrongful life cases. In the right-to-die
cases, the person has experienced life and is making a determination that life as he or she knows it is
not worth living. E.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64; Note, Informed Consent and the Dying
Patient. 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1632-34 (1974). In wrongful life cases, the child has not experienced
life and cannot know what it will be like with the defects. Consequently, the unborn child in wrongful
life cases cannot make the same determination that is involved in the right-to-die cases. Further, the
unborn child actually makes no decision at all in wrongful life cases. The court just determines that
the child would rather not be born than be born with his birth defects.
98. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
99. Id. at 693; accord Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 13. Contra Turpin v. Sortini.
31 Cal. 3d 220, 233, 643 P.2d 954, 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344-45 (1982).
100. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689,692 (1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,412,386 N.E.2d 807, 812,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978).
101. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 232, 643 P.2d 954, 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344 (1982);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689. 692 (1967): Becker v. Schwartz. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 386 N.E. 2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895.900 (1978).
102. Berman v. Allan. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979) (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove. 49
N.J. 22. 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967)).
103. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421. 404 A.2d 8. 12 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376
(1975). Even the Harbeson court conceded that the comparison of impaired life and nonexistence "is
a task that is beyond mortals, whether judges or jurors." Harbeson. 98 Wn. 2d at 482, 656 P.2d at
496.
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B. The Harbeson Court's Reasoning
The court stated that "[w]rongful life is the child's equivalent of the
parents' wrongful birth action." 104 It saw the two claims as so related that
"it would be illogical and anomalous to permit only parents, and not the
child, to recover for the cost of the child's own medical care." 105 Conse-
quently, the court analyzed wrongful life in the same manner as wrongful
birth, focusing in turn on duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.
The court noted that one problem with finding a duty to the child in this
circumstance is that the alleged negligence always occurs before birth and
often before conception. The court dismissed this problem, however, by
stating that Washington courts have allowed actions for prenatal injuries
for twenty years. 106 It also cited the California Supreme Court for the
proposition that a duty can exist prior to conception.107 The court held,
therefore, that the physician owes a duty to unborn and-unconceived per-
sons subject only to the limitation of foreseeability.108
The Harbeson court then rejected the position that recognizing a duty
to an unborn child to prevent birth with defects disavows the sanctity of
life. ' 09 It agreed with the California Supreme Court's decision, in Turpin
v. Sortini, that an award of damages to a handicapped child neither disa-
vows the sanctity of life nor suggests that the child is not entitled to the
rights and privileges accorded to all members of society. 110
After rejecting these two arguments and noting the advantages of rec-
ognizing such a duty,1 "the court held that the physician has a duty to the
104. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 478, 656 P.2d at 494. The court said:
In a wrongful life claim, "[t]he child does not allege that the physician's negligence caused
the child's deformity. Rather, the claim is that the physician's negligence-his failure to ade-
quately inform the parents of the risk-has caused the birth of the deformed child. The child
argues that but for the inadequate advice, it would not have been born to experience the pain and
suffering attributable to the deformity."
Id.(quoting Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv. 480, 485
(1980)).
105. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 479, 656 P.2d at 495 (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220,
238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982)).
106. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 480, 656 P.2d at 495 (citing Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59
Wn. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962)).
107. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 480, 656 P.2d at 495 (citing Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643
P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)).
108. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 480, 656 P.2d at495.
109. Id. at481,656P.2dat496.
110. Id. (citing Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 232-33, 643 P.2d 954, 961, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337,344 (1982)). The California Supreme Court said:
To begin with, it is hard to see how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffer-
ing child would "disavow" the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is not entitled to
the full measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to all members of society.
Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 643 P.2d at 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
I1I. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496; see also supra note 63.
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unborn or unconceived child. This duty is to inform the parents of the
material risks that the child will suffer birth defects and to conform to the
appropriate standard of care if action is taken to prevent conception or
birth of the child. 112
The court considered the second element of the wrongful life claim to
be easily established: the physician breaches his or her duty by failing to
observe the appropriate standard of care. 113
The court noted that the injury element of a claim for wrongful life has
been the most difficult to establish. Nevertheless, the court rejected the
argument that it is impossible to determine whether birth is an injury and,
therefore, to measure compensatory damages. 114 It held that general dam-
ages could not be recovered because they are impossible to assess, but
concluded that special damages are calculable with reasonable certainty
and should be recoverable. 115
Finally, the court held that establishing cause in fact establishes proxi-
mate cause. 116 If the plaintiff child would not have been born "but for"
the negligence of the physician, then there is "no reason a finder of fact
could not find that the [physician's] negligence was a proximate cause of
the [child's] injuries." ' 17 Having established duty, breach, causation,
and injury, the court stated that a cause of action for wrongful life exists
in Washington. 118
C. Analysis
The court treated the claim for wrongful life as "the child's equivalent
of the parents' wrongful birth action." 119 This parallel structure is impor-
tant in examining the court's reasoning. Much of the necessary analysis
of the four elements of the claim for wrongful life was simply taken as
established by the court's earlier discussion of the claim for wrongful
birth. 120
To the extent that the court used its wrongful birth reasoning to recog-
nize the wrongful life claim, the analysis is inadequate. Even though the
two claims arise from the same negligent act or omission, they are differ-
112. Harbeson, 98Wn. 2d at 480,656 P.2d at 495.
113. Id. at482,656P.2dat496.
114. Id.
115. Id. The special damages consist of the costs of special medical treatment and training be-
yond that required by children not afflicted with the plaintiff's birth defects. Id.
116. Id. at 483,656 P.2d at 497.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 478, 656 P.2d at 494.
120. See id. at 480, 656 P.2d at 495.
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ent in at least three respects. First, the two claims differ in the fundamen-
tal question of injury to the plaintiff. In wrongful birth claims, the court
must determine whether the parents have been injured, while in wrongful
life claims the question is whether the child has been injured. These are
different questions which may yield different answers. 121 Because of the
difference between the alleged injuries in the two claims, wrongful life is
not the "child's equivalent" 122 of the parent's wrongful birth claim.
Second, the claims differ in the comparison that lies at the heart of
each. In wrongful birth claims, the birth of the child can be determined to
be an injury to the parents by comparing two known situations: life with
normal children and life with children with birth defects. This process is
common to all tort actions. In wrongful life claims, however, birth can be
determined to be an injury to the child only by comparing a known situa-
tion with an unknown situation: life with birth defects and nonexistence.
This process is totally unknown to tort actions. Thus, the fundamental
comparison required by each claim is different.
Finally, the claims differ in the nature of the duty imposed by each.
The physician's duty to the parents is to protect their right not to have
children with birth defects. The physician's duty to the child is to protect
the child's right not to be born. The parents' right is grounded in the
availability of information about birth defects and in their right to an abor-
tion. 12 3 There is no apparent foundation for the child's right not to be
born. 124 Thus, the analogy fails because the element of duty is different
for each claim.
In short, wrongful life actions cannot be supported by analogy to
wrongful birth actions. The two causes of action are different in injury,
duty, and measure of harm. Thus, courts can grant one claim and not the
other. These differences become more apparent in examining the court's
reasoning on each of four aspects of the wrongful life cause of action:
injury, duty, proximate cause, and damages.
1. Injury
The concept of injury is crucial to the court's analysis. 125 A court must
121. Many of the courts that have granted wrongful birth claims have denied wrongful life
claims. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
122. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 478,656 P.2d at 494.
123. See id. at 472, 656 P.2d at 491; see also supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
125. See supra part lIC1.
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establish an injury to the plaintiff before it can discuss duty or damages.
A finding that birth is an injury to the deformed child is a prerequisite to a
discussion of (1) any duty owed to that child before birth, 126 and (2) what
types of damages will be allowed for the injury. 127
The Harbeson court, however, never established that birth with defor-
mities is an injury. Other than a bare statement that birth is the injury, 128
the court's analysis is limited to an attempt to overcome the two major
obstacles courts have found to reaching such a conclusion: (1) the diffi-
culty of measuring damages, and (2) the argument that allowing wrongful
life claims will disavow the sanctity of life. 129
The court attempted to overcome the first obstacle by disallowing
claims for general damages and allowing only the recovery of special
damages. Thus, the court found "unpersuasive" the objection that dam-
ages are too uncertain to be allowed. 130
This analysis misses the major thrust of the objection. The major obsta-
cle other jurisdictions have encountered was not in quantifying damages,
but in finding any injury for which the plaintiff could be compensated. 13'
Essentially, the court ignored the question of injury and proceeded
straight to the question of damages. Injury must be established before
damages even become an issue. 132 The measure of damages is secondary
126. Establishing that birth in an impaired state is an injury is crucial to the discussion of duty.
Duty is only the conclusion that the defendant ought to be under a legal obligation to avoid risking
injury to the plaintiff. See W. PROSSER, supra note 74, § 53. Stating that there is a duty begs the
essential question of whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against injury by
the defendant's conduct. Id. Thus, before the court can impose a duty to the unborn child on physi-
cians, it must first determine that the result of a breach of that duty-birth with defects-is an injury
to the child. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
127. The concept of injury is also crucial to the discussion of damages. Damages are awarded to
compensate injury. They attempt to restore an injured person to the position he or she occupied before
the wrong occurred. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 232, 643 P.2d 954. 961. 182 Cal. Rptr. 337.
344: Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); C. MCCORMICK. supra note 82, §
137.
Damages can compensate an injury, but they should not be used to prove its existence. Similarly,
damages should be awarded only to compensate the specific injury claimed. Thus, before the court
can discuss damages in a claim for wrongful life, it should independently establish (1) that birth is in
fact an injury, and (2) that the damages will compensate only that specific injury.
128. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 483, 656 P.2d at 497.
129. Id. at 482, 656 P.2d at 496-97.
130. Id.
131. E.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 12(1979).
132. As the California Supreme Court recently stated: "In the first place, the problem is not ...
simply the fixing of damages for a conceded injury, but the threshold question of determining
whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury by being born with an ailment as opposed to not
being born at all." Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
Unlike the Washington Supreme Court. the California Supreme Court realized that the primary
question was a determination of injury, not an assessment of damages. Unfortunately, the Turpin
court made the same mistake that the Harbeson court did in confusing the determination of injury
with an assessment of damages. See infra note 133.
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to the issue of whether the child has "suffered any damage cognizable at
law by being brought into existence." 133
This failure to establish that birth is an injury to a deformed child is
fatal to the court's analysis of the wrongful life cause of action. The
Harbeson court's inability to establish that birth is an injury to the child
results from the impossibility of this task. In wrongful life claims, the
alleged injury is birth in a deformed condition. 134 Since the child's only
other alternative was nonexistence, determination of whether the child
has in fact been injured requires a comparison of life in an impaired con-
dition with nonexistence. 135 But such a comparison is literally impossible
because the notion of nonexistence is unfathomable. 136
In the first wrongful life case, the New Jersey Supreme Court deter-
mined that "[t]his court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments
against the nonexistence of life itself." 137 This problem has concerned
every court that has examined a wrongful life cause of action. 138 All but
the Harbeson and Turpin courts have held that their inability to make this
comparison was fatal to the wrongful life cause of action. 139 The Harbe-
son and Turpin courts merely avoided the issue by discussing damages
instead of injury. 140 Because determination of injury in wrongful life
133. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979). The California Supreme Court
stated:
[Riecovery should be denied because (1) it is simply impossible to determine in any rational or
reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired rather
than not being born, and (2) even if it were possible to overcome the first hurdle, it would be
impossible to assess general damages in any fair, nonspeculative manner.
Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. Again, the Turpin court correctly
perceived the problem as the impossibility of finding an injury and a subsequent problem of uncertain
damages. The court reasoned to a finding of injury by disallowing uncertain general damages and
allowing the easily calculable costs of the defects. See id. at 237-38, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 348. But these special damages do not compensate the claimed injury in wrongful life actions. See
infra note 170 and accompanying text. Furthermore, existence of the injury should not be proven by
showing that damages are recoverable; rather, granting damages should be based on a prior finding of
injury. See infra text accompanying note 168.
134. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
135. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
136. See id.
137. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
138. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547-48 (Ala. 1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372,
375-76(1975).
139. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (D.S.C. 1980); Gildinerv. Thomas Jeffer-
son Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548
(Ala. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401,412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900-01 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d
846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76
(1975).
140. See Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at482, 656 P.2d at496; Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237-38, 643 P.2d
at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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claims requires a comparison of life in an impaired condition with the
unfathomable notion of nonexistence, wrongful life claims "should be
dismissed for failure to state legally cognizable causes of action." 141
The Washington court summarily dismissed the second obstacle 142 by
concluding that awarding damages to a deformed child does not disavow
the sanctity of life.143 Once again, however, the court missed the major
thrust of the objection.
Life with defects may be less desirable than life without defects. If so,
compensating the child for defects is not a disavowal of the sanctity of
that life. But wrongful life actions regard birth, not the defects, as the
actionable injury. 144 The very basis of the wrongful life claim is that life
with defects is not worth living and ought to be destroyed before birth.
Such a disavowal of life runs counter to society's deeply rooted belief that
life, in whatever condition, is more precious than nonexistence. 145
Society's belief in the sanctity of life permeates the documents on
which our society is founded. The Declaration of Independence declares
man's "unalienable" right to life to be a "self evident" truth, 146 and the
United States Constitution characterizes life as one of the three funda-
mental rights deserving special protection. 147 The Washington State Con-
stitution declares that governments "are established to protect and main-
tain individual rights" 148 and includes the right to life in a list of personal
rights. ' 49 States universally reserve the highest penalties for persons de-
priving others of their right to life. ' 50 The principle that all life is to be
preserved, and that it is government's purpose to do so, lies at the heart of
our society.
The sanctity of any given life is not dependent on the condition of that
life. It is life itself and not only life in a perfect condition that is "jeal-
141. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812,413 N.Y.S.2d 895,901
(1978).
142. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
143. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496 (quoting Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 643 P.2d
at 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45): see also supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
144. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 478, 656 P.2d at 494; Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not
to be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv. 480, 485 (1980).
145. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404
A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411,386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895, 900 (1978); see also supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
146. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. XIV § I.
148. WASH. CONST. art. I § 1.
149. WASH. CONST art. I § 3.
150. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979). Even in imposing its highest pen-
alty, a state may not execute a convicted murderer without giving him or her special procedural
protections. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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ously safeguarded."151 The amount of protection given to a person's life
does not vary with the degree of his or her defects. Thus, courts conclude
that "life-whether experienced with or without a major physical handi-
cap-is more precious than non-life.'1 52 Allowing wrongful life claims
contradicts that fundamental notion, for it turns life into an actionable
injury.
To summarize, the court's discussion of injury suffered from three de-
fects. First, injury is a threshold issue that must be resolved before any
discussion of duty or damages is possible. The court's reasoning was
flawed because its attempts to show injury relied on its conclusion that
there was a duty and its confusion of injury with damages. Second, the
court misconceived the problem resulting from the inability to compare
life in an impaired condition with nonexistence. Contrary to the court's
assumption, this problem does not merely affect the court's ability to
grant general damages, it precludes the conclusion that there was an in-
jury. Third, the wrongful life cause of action contradicts our fundamental
concern for the sanctity of life because it requires the court to decide that
nonexistence is preferable to life with defects.
2. Duty
The court's inability to justify adequately the concept of injury has im-
portant ramifications for its discussion of duty. The court should not im-
pose a duty on the physician to avoid the birth of a deformed child unless
the child's birth is an injury to the child. If the birth is a benefit to the
child, or at least neither a benefit nor an injury, the physician has no duty
to prevent the birth.
The court enumerated several benefits to society that would accompany
recognizing a duty to the child. 153 While these policy considerations are
themselves open to debate, 154 that argument is unnecessary: absent a
showing of injury to the child, no duty should attach to the physician. 155
151. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979).
152. Id. at 12.
153. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496. The policy considerations articulated by the
court are fostering genetic counseling and prenatal testing, discouraging medical malpractice, and
providing comprehensive compensation for victims of medical malpractice. Id.
154. The court never established why furtherance of these policies is beneficial. If they are bene-
ficial, it is only because birth in an impaired state is an injury and, therefore, allowing it to happen is
medical malpractice. The court's failure to establish that birth is an injury prevents it from showing
that these policies are beneficial and ought to be promoted.
155. The court should not promote these policies by imposing a duty on the physician that is
unwarranted by the case before it. If the physician has done no wrong-has not injured the child-it
should not be within the court's power to impose a duty on the physician solely for the benefit of
society.
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Failure to establish that birth is an injury precludes recognition of a duty
owed by the physician to the unborn child regardless of the benefits to
society.
Further, even if birth with defects is an injury, there is a second prereq-
uisite to establishing a duty: the plaintiff must have a right to legal protec-
tion of his interests. 156 No duty can be imposed on the physician unless
the unborn child has a legally protected right to be born free of defects. 157
Thus, "the essential postulate of any wrongful life claim is the 'right of a
child to be born as a whole, functional human being.' ,,158 This right is
essential to finding a duty to the preborn child, yet the court never dealt
with the issue.
Failure to establish expressly that the child has a right not to be born
should bar imposition of a duty on the physician to the child because there
are several indications that such a right does not exist. First, there is no
precedent for recognizing a right to be born as a whole, functional human
being. 159 Second, the United States Supreme Court has cast doubt on the
possibility that an unborn child has any legally protected rights, by deny-
ing that an unborn child has a legally protected right to life. 160 Finally,
"rights" exist between persons as legal entities in society. They do not
exist between persons and non-persons. As legal non-persons,'61 unborn
children are incapable of having rights. Thus, the right to be born healthy
is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of a duty on the physician in a
claim for wrongful life, but the existence of such a right has not been
established. The Washington Supreme Court did not even discuss that
right.
3. Proximate Cause
The court's analysis of proximate cause is also superficial. The court
assumed that birth is the actionable injury and that physicians have a duty
156. W. PROSSER, supra note 74, § 53.
157. Rogers, supra note 34, at 716.
158. Id. (quoting Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1977), modified sub
noma. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)). Other arti-
culations of this legally protected right include "a fundamental fight to be born healthy," Fundamen-
tal Right to be Born Healthy, supra note 3, at 553, and "a right not to be born," Gleitman v. Cos-
grove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
159. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812. 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900
(1978); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546. 548 (Ala. 1978).
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973). The Harbeson court did not hesitate to recog-
nize that prenatal injuries suffered by the child are actionable. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 480, 656 P.2d
at 495. Presumably, this is so because the unborn child has a right not to be injured in utero. At the
same time, however, the same unborn child has no right to life. It seems inconsistent that the child
may seek compensation for being injured but not for being destroyed.
161. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
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to the child to prevent birth in an impaired condition by informing the
parents of the risks of birth defects. But between the physician's informa-
tion and the birth is an intervening cause: the parents. The parents can
decide to have the child anyway. 162
Only two conclusions can be drawn from this. Either (1) informing the
parents of the defect relieves the physician of all liability, or (2) the physi-
cian's duty to the child is not only to inform the parents, but also to ensure
that the abortion is performed. The second choice seems unreasonable
because it would deny the parents the right to make basic reproductive
decisions, and because forcing an abortion on the mother would be a tor-
tious invasion of her rights and body. 163 Thus, the physician should be
relieved of liability once he or she has informed the parents of the mate-
rial risks. But that is not the end of the problem.
First, if the parents decide to give birth to the deformed child, the child
is still injured if birth is the injury. The reasons for compensating the
child for the injury remain compelling. The parents therefore must be the
proximate cause of the injury. Potentially, this gives the child a wrongful
life claim against the parents. At least one appellate court that granted a
wrongful life cause of action has realized that claims against parents are a
logical consequence. 164
Second, the claim for wrongful life vests in the child before birth and
possibly even before conception. 165 The parents' decision to bear the de-
formed child cannot prejudice the child's claim against the physician.
Therefore, if the physician only advises the parents of the risk of birth
defects and does nothing more, such as counsel the parents to abort, a
judge or jury may still find that the physician proximately caused the
birth. 166 Thus, the parents' knowing decision to bear a deformed child
may not relieve the physician of liability to the child.
162. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
163. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (a woman's decision to abort or not is within her
right to privacy).
164. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980),
rev'd in part, Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 953, 182 Cal. Rptr. 33tr. 337 (1982). See
also Waters, Wrongful Life: The Implications of Suits in Wrongful Life Brought by Children Against
Their Parents, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 411 (1981-82) (concluding that a wrongful life suit brought by a
child against its parent is irreconcilable with a mother's constitutionally protected right to privacy and
with the doctrine of parental immunity); Note, Child v. Parent: A Viable New Tort of Wrongful Life?,
24 ARMz. L. REv. 391 (1982) (same).
165. Harbeson, 98Wn.2dat472,656P.2dat491.
166. See W. PROSSER. supra note 74, § 45. Proximate cause simply means legal cause-that is, a
cause of the injury to which liability should attach. Thus, if the judge or jury finds that if the physi-
cian had done something more than just inform the parents of the risks of birth defects the child would
not have been bom, the physician is a cause of the birth. If the judge or jury finds further that the
physician should be liable for the alleged injury, the physician could be the proximate cause of the
birth as well.
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4. Damages
The court's analysis of damages suffers in two ways from its failure to
establish injury in wrongful life claims. First, the court raised the dam-
ages issue for the wrong purpose. The question of recoverable damages
can arise only after the existence of an injury is established. 167 It begs the
question to disallow general damages, as the court did, in an effort to
avoid the problem of an injury that results in uncertain damages. The un-
certainty of general damages is a direct result of the uncertainty of
whether there is an injury and what that injury is. Disallowing uncertain
elements of recoverable damages does not remove this problem.
Second, even granting that birth with defects is a compensable injury,
the court misanalyzed the damages issue. Any damages allowed in a
wrongful life claim should compensate the child for harm arising because
life with defects is less desirable than nonexistence. 168 But the special
damages allowed by the court compensate for the difference in burden
between life with defects and normal life, not between life with defects
and nonexistence. 169
An award of special damages does not compensate for the relevant in-
jury in wrongful life actions because it compensates someone who, were
it not for the injury, would not exist. 170 Nothing the physician could have
done would have given the plaintiff a normal life. Since tort damages are
compensatory in nature,1 7 1 it is inconsistent with basic tort principles to
view the injury for which the physician is legally responsible solely by
reference to the plaintiff's present condition. 172 It is also necessary to rec-
ognize that if the physician had not been negligent, the child would not
have been born. 173
Furthermore, although the relevant injury in wrongful life claims is the
birth, special damages compensate for the defects. Only general damages
167. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
168. This follows from the compensatory nature of tort damages. Tort damages place the plain-
tiff, as far as money can, in the position he or she would have been in had there been no negligence.
Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344; C. MCCORMICK. supra note 82. §
137. In wrongful life cases, this requires comparison of life with nonexistence. See supra notes
134-35 and accompanying text.
169. The court awarded damages for medical treatment and training "beyond that required by
children not afflicted with fetal hydantoin syndrome." Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 483, 656 P.2d at 497.
170. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 232,643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
171. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979); D. DOBBS. supra note 79, § 3.1; C.
MCCORMICK. supra note 82, § 137.
172. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344; Wrongful Life Comment,
supra note 92, at 495-98.
173. Turpin. 31 Cal. 3d at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344; Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978); Fundamental Right to be
Born Healthy. supra note 3, at 542.
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can compensate for the injury. According to the court, wrongful life is a
claim by a child for "the pain and suffering attributable to the de-
formity." 174 But pain and suffering damages are general damages, which
the court denied. Special damages are not a substitute for general dam-
ages and are inappropriate in this context because they do not compensate
for the claimed injury. Thus, the court granted the wrong damages for the
wrong reasons. In denying general damages and awarding special dam-
ages, the court illustrated its faulty analysis of damages under a wrongful
life claim and denied the child the only damages that could compensate
for the alleged injury.
A proper analysis of damages under a wrongful life claim indicates that
the courts cannot award damages in a wrongful life action. The court
should not award general damages because courts are incapable of mak-
ing the comparison necessary in computing compensatory damages. 175
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that:
[s]uch a computation would require the trier of fact to measure the differ-
ence in value between life in an impaired condition and the "utter void of
nonexistence." Such an endeavor, however, is literally impossible ...
[M]an "who knows nothing of death or nothingness," simply cannot affix a
price tag to non-life. 176
The court should not award special damages because such damages com-
pensate for the defects, not for the injury. Thus, there should be no recov-
erable damages under a wrongful life claim.
In conclusion, the wrongful life cause of action should be denied.
Wrongful life claims fail principally because of the inability of courts to
establish that birth with defects is an injury to the child. Inability to find
an injury precludes discussion of the other elements of the claim because
they all depend on the existence of an injury. Even if injury is granted,
there is the inherent problem that the only damages that can compensate
the child for the injury are uncertain general damages. The Harbeson
court did not eliminate these obstacles to recognizing the wrongful life
cause of action.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TORT RECOVERY IN HARBESON
A. Alternatives to the Creation of New Causes ofAction in Harbeson
Unless the tort system is to become simply an umbrella under which
174. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 478,656 P.2d at 494.
175. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
176. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979) (citations omitted) (quoting Gleitman
v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, J., concurring and dissenting)).
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judges may grant relief according to preference, the courts should analyze
cases and reason to holdings within the confines of accepted tort princi-
ples. Existing principles should not be stretched beyond recognition in
order to allow recovery in specific cases. If a claim does not fit within
accepted tort principles, there should be no recovery unless the tort prin-
ciples are changed by the legislature. 177 At the very least, a court should
adhere to accepted tort principles unless the facts of the case present a
clear need to depart from them. 178
The Washington Supreme Court did not have to recognize the causes of
action for wrongful birth and wrongful life to compensate the plaintiffs in
this case. By prescribing Dilantin without making a literature search or
consulting other sources, the defendant physicians caused the children's
defects. 179 These defects were an injury to both the parents and the chil-
dren under traditional tort analysis.1 80 The United States District Court
found that the physicians breached the standard of care and were negli-
gent. 181 That negligence was the proximate cause of the children's inju-
ries. 182 Thus, accepted tort theories of medical malpractice would have
allowed recovery of all the damages that the court allowed under both
causes of action. The court never had to reach the question of whether
either cause of action is recognized in Washington.
B. Alternatives to Tort Litigation
Although birth with defects should not be a compensable injury to the
177. When existing tort principles preclude recognition of a cause of action, it is generally
viewed as a bar to judicial recognition of the claim. New causes of action are legislative decisions.
See, e.g., Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 104, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979) (granting a cause of action
to a child for injury to a parent is a legislative decision). Several courts have felt that this is true of the
wrongful life claim. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413. 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978). Several state legislatures have barred the wrongful life claim by statute.
E.g.. MINN STAT ANN § 145.424 (West 1982 Supp.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN §§ 21-55 (1982
Supp.). The California legislature has barred wrongful life claims against parents. CAL CIV CODE §
43.6 (West 1982). The Washington legislature also considered legislation to bar the wrongful life
cause of action in Washington. H. 178, 48th. Wash. Leg. (1983); S. 3269, 48th. Wash. Leg. (1983).
178. Hunsley v. Giard. 87 Wn. 2d 424,434, 553 P.2d 1096, 1102 (1976) (court should adhere to
traditional principles, theories, and standards of tort law in order to avoid confusion in the law). Even
the Harbeson court was careful to try to fit wrongful birth and wrongful life into existing tort princi-
ples. Harbeson, 98 Wn. 2d at 471, 480, 656 P.2d at 491,495.
179. Harbeson. 98 Wn. 2d at 463-64,656 P.2d at 486-87.
180. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wn. 2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835 (1962) (recog-
nizing child's cause of action for prenatal injuries); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wn. 2d 597, 599-600, 537
P.2d 266, 267 (1975) (holding that an unborn viable fetus is a "child" under WASH. REV CODE §
4.24.010, thus allowing parents to sue for death or injury of an unborn viable fetus): W. PROSSER.
supra note 74. § 55.
181. Harbeson. 98 Wn. 2d at 464.656 P.2d at 487.
182. Id. at 463-64, 656 P.2d at 486-87.
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child under tort law, this does not mean that the resulting burdens should
be ignored. It indicates only that the alleged wrongdoers were not in fact
wrongdoers and, therefore, that physicians should not bear the cost of
alleviating the burden of the defects. This is so even if they were wrong-
doers to others at the same time. Because wrongful birth. and wrongful
life claims are inherently different, a solution to the former problem may
lie in a tort claim. A solution to the latter problem is better found else-
where.
Denying recovery under a wrongful life claim does not solve the
child's problem: the defects still exist. The same regard for the sanctity of
life that should lead to rejection of wrongful life claims183 requires us to
assist the child and his or her parents in bearing this burden. Thus, the
pertinent consideration becomes who should bear the expense. If it is not
to be the health care system, then some other mechanism must be found.
A logical mechanism lies within the structure of public welfare pro-
grams. Existing social welfare programs manifest society's judgment that
public funds should be devoted to helping individuals who have special
problems. Private organizations also provide a feasible alternative to tort
recovery. By soliciting private contributions, organizations can fund pro-
grams designed specifically for individuals with mental and physical birth
defects.
Of course, even with these programs some needs go unfulfilled. But
these programs need not be viewed as the only possibilities for aiding
children with birth defects. Rather, they are models and foundations for
programs that could be designed to help such children. By improving ex-
isting programs and initiating new programs where old ones leave off,
alternatives to tort recovery can be found to assist these children.
This Note does not suggest a specific proposal to aid children with birth
defects. Such an undertaking requires detailed study of existing programs
and exploration of available possibilities. This Note simply suggests that
the solution is a matter of priorities. Disallowing tort recovery for life
with defects simply forces us to look elsewhere. Such an undertaking is
necessary and, if given the proper priority, should succeed. Denying
wrongful life claims because of a fundamental belief in the sanctity of life
should force society to better assure the quality of all life.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., the Washington Supreme Court rec-
ognized claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life, but the court's logic
183. See supra notes 97-99 & 146-152 and accompanying text.
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does not support its conclusions. It failed to demonstrate that birth with
defects is an injury to the child. Because this essential premise is unsup-
ported, no duty to the child should be imposed on the physician to prevent
that child's birth with defects, and no damages for wrongful life should be
allowed to compensate for the unproven injury.
This failure of the court's logic is not fatal to its recognition of the
wrongful birth claim because this claim is a logical result of existing pre-
cedent. The court, however, insufficiently established (1) that the birth of
a deformed child is in fact an injury to the parents, and (2) that if the birth
is an injury to the parents, the damages set forth in section 4.24.010 of the
Washington Revised Code are appropriate.
The cause of action for wrongful life should not be allowed because no
one can determine that birth is an injury to a child born with defects. No
one knows how to think of nonexistence, let alone whether it is more
desirable than impaired life. Because every other element of a tort action
is based on the ability to establish that an injury has in fact occurred,
wrongful life claims should not be recognized.
Philip J. VanDerhoef
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